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Divorce Act

By A ‘Common Woman’

When Arjuna went to the battlefield and realized that he must fight his loved ones, he no longer wanted to fight. His fingers trembled as his bow fell from his hand. He was depressed.

When you are depressed, you lose your will to fight. You want to self-destruct. You feel completely and utterly hopeless. If you are me, then you do not want to feel positive about a situation because you are afraid, you’ll sink lower into depression if you allow yourself to feel happy for even a moment.

I think my marriage is ending. I know the feeling – it’s familiar to me by now: exhaustion, high blood pressure, insomnia, everything feels… static. It’s like you’re a fallen soldier on a battlefield. There’s a war going on around you and you know you must fight, but you’re lying on the dusty ground, seeing blood and gore around you thinking, “What’s the point?” You want to rest but you can’t. You want to silence your mind, but all you feel is numb. Pointless. Fleeting moments of happiness, amusement, and joy come and go, as you observe the world with a heavy heart and a restless brain.

Deep down, I know my marriage was never a strong one to begin with. Sure, it carried with it the promise of a wonderful and fulfilling relationship. After all, who voluntarily enters a marriage thinking it might not last? I entered mine with hope and trepidation. I knew we had potential problems we needed to sort out, but as long as ‘we’ were a team, we would manage to overcome every challenge sooner or later, right?

Turns out, when it comes to a large number of men, or perhaps Indian men, there is no ‘we’ in a marriage. For mine too, the ‘we’ in my marriage belongs to my husband and his parents. In one of the many fights we had in the first couple of months of our marriage, I’d yelled, “You and your parents are a team, but what about me?” I don’t even remember what he said, but I highly doubt he’d have reassured me otherwise.

I have never been part of my husband’s club since we got married until the day of our impending divorce. His parents make all the decisions for their thirty-three-year-old child. What work he does at his office, what he wears to what he eats are all dependent on their wishes. He doesn’t get up from bed in the morning or go to sleep at night without hearing from them. And if you’re wondering whether he was like this on our honeymoon as well, let me tell you he canceled having a honeymoon in the first place and instead, chose to spend his vacation days hanging out with his parents. In fact, he spends all his vacation days reserved for his parents – not even one out of twenty-one days is for anyone else. And not a single one belongs to me.

I never thought I would be the girl on the internet ranting about her husband. Then again, I never thought I would be the girl who’d be contemplating a divorce when I have wanted my own beautiful love story since I was five years old. To have the perfect partner, you must be the perfect partner. So I became the most perfect version of myself I could be: got the best education from the best places, got multiple certifications, got the good job, and developed all the skills a person should have – be it cooking, taking care of pets, driving, changing a bulb, you name it. I continue to educate myself on all things that matter to him, from how to give the perfect blowjobs to how to invest wisely in high-risk investments. From doing my laundry to filing my taxes, I do everything and try to learn everything.

Yet, it makes no difference to my marriage. If my mother-in-law tells him not to eat a banana because it’ll give him ‘high cholesterol’, he won’t touch a banana. All the logic in the world given by his wife makes no difference. After a point, you think, “Did my husband want a ‘wife’ for his parents or a best friend for life?” Sadly, I know the answer and it depresses me more.

I do not want to complain about my husband. What I do want to do is ask all parents – Is this what you want, your child to remain co-dependent for the rest of your lives? What will that child do when you are too old, and he can neither talk to you nor his estranged wife and kids? Why are so many mothers hell-bent on making their children completely unsuitable for the world? Will we as a society ever change, or will you continue to ruin the lives of more women and ultimately, blame them when things fall apart?

In the end though, Arjuna had to perform his duty, his dharma, just like millions of Indian women who fight for their marriage despite society considering them the outsider in a family of parents and their son. And when they fail like the Pandava prince, they surrender the fate of their lives to Krishna, and the divine will of the universe.

Guest Author (Anonymous)

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By Lauren Prem

Women in India, like in most developing countries across the world, have suffered long-standing oppression to the point where taglines such as “striving for gender equality”, “women empowerment” and “women rights” are so popular and basic for any write-up title. In search of a unique and catchy title, I opened ChatGPT to send a prompt – “write an empowering and catchy quote on women who have discriminatory personal laws in India” and received the following response:

“Women are not just subjects of personal laws; they are champions of change, fighting for justice and equality in every corner of India.”

I was pleasantly shocked to see the response especially because it reflected the current scenario of Muslim women in India that resulted in a Supreme Court verdict reiterating the maintenance rights of Muslim women under section 125 of the CrPC in Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1686] as already held in the famous Shah Bano case [Mohammed Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum, 1985 (2) SCC 556].

A petition for appeal, before the Supreme Court, was moved by the husband on grounds that a woman cannot avail maintenance benefits under section 125 of the CrPC in the presence of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1986 act’), which is a specific law. The contention is premised on the well-established rule of interpretation that a specific law will prevail over a general law on the same matter, in case of any conflict as regards which law will apply.

The court, on 10th July 2024, passed a verdict stating that a Muslim woman can avail maintenance benefits under section 125 of the CrPC despite there being a specific law. The court recognised that the 1986 act provided for maintenance only till the iddat period, which ran contrary to the jurisprudence behind maintenance. The purpose of maintenance is to equip women to lead a dignified life even after the cessation of her marriage and the 1986 act does not solve the purpose as it fails to provide for adequate maintenance, despite the objective of the act grounded in ensuring access to justice. The court, in this case, went beyond mere application of the 1986 act and considered foundational jurisprudential concepts like justice and equity.

Our legal history has repeatedly shown us that landmark judgements are not an outcome of mere interpretation of the law. Rather, they are a result of meticulous interpretation of judges who bear ‘justice’ in their hearts and minds, not just the legal provisions. The basic structure doctrine that forms the very basis of present-day adjudication, would not have existed today, had the judiciary stayed aloof of judicial activism or anything beyond strictly interpreting the law.

The doctrine exists solely because judges feared that the constitution would be misused in the absence of a strong framework to determine constitutionality of a particular legislation. In simple terms, they had justice in their hearts and minds, in addition to possessing knowledge of the law.

The present judgement is also one that reflects a justice-oriented approach, not merely in the outcome but through its words. The court stressed upon the aspect of adequacy and sufficiency of maintenance in answering the legal question of which law would apply to Muslim women. Had the court taken a formalistic approach (restricted to interpretation of the law alone), it would have rendered the 1986 act applicable, thereby providing no opportunity to Muslim women to opt for the CrPC provision.

In addition, the CrPC provision has also undergone an amendment in the year 2001 [by Section 2(i)(a), act no. 50] to delete the words “not exceeding 500 rupees in the whole”, thereby eliminating any kind of upper cap on the amount of maintenance. The court highlights the aspect of how this new amendment being passed subsequent to the the 1986 act, renders the latter legislation insignificant. The approach of the court in this regard also revolves around the question of which law would benefit women better, rather than delving into the technicalities of applying each law as every ordinary judge would do so.

As Huey Newton said “Laws should be made to serve the people. People should not be made to serve the laws.” This moral principle is prominent in the context of deciding which law would apply to a particular scenario or class of persons. The court abided by this principle by opening opportunities for Muslim women to choose the CrPC provision, rather than making them subjects of the 1986 act.

The court has been particular in ensuring that no decision is taken so as to deprive women of enjoying the rights guaranteed under our constitution. This cardinal principle of not holding back or non-retrogression has been evolved through many judgements and established as a definite rule. This principle has been followed through a purposive interpretation which holds that the nature of the 1986 act is akin to a social legislation and welfare lies at its heart.

This decision also ensures that undue financial burden is not placed on the husband as section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC deals with a situation where maintenance has already been paid through customary or personal law. The provision bestows power upon the magistrate to cancel orders made under section 125 of the CrPC, in situations where maintenance is already paid. In essence, the court has merely opened the possibility of opting for a comparatively higher welfare provision and has not in any way prompted double payment of maintenance by the husband. The judicial intent is rooted solely in upholding the interests of women, as article 15(3) aims to do.

The judiciary has succeeded in meeting people’s expectations through a purposive interpretation that looks beyond the letters of the law and goes on to honour the spirit of law. Further, it has proven that women are not subjects of personal laws. With increasing access to education, women have proven to be champions of change striving for equality in every nook and corner of India and the judiciary has facilitated the same by setting a good precedent.

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Author: Sayan Dasgupta

The sporadic distribution of persons, identity, culture, language has always been a part of the Indic civilization. This heterogeneity implied a myriad of personal laws; both codified and uncodified. Where such diversity is engrained in the social fabric of India, such diversity could also mean plurality of gendered injustices. Delhi High Court on this note grappled and encouraged the Centre to act on the idea of Uniform Civil Code such that it doesn’t “remain a mere hope”. However, the Courts’ activism is not recent. Kerala HC in Agnes Alias Kunjumol v. Regeena Thomas also highlighted the need for such a legislation for subsistence of marital institution.    

The tapestry of Bharat and its consonance with debate of UCC is a stuck gramophone. Where one camp argues for uniformity and homogeneity of personal laws, another camp argues that it would bludgeon religious freedom. However, a fruitful discourse is impossible without a substance of the legislation or a bill to test the veracity of either of those camps. Notwithstanding that, what can be subjected to a litmus test is the Goan Uniform Civil Code which has been lauded by the former Chief Justice of India. The Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 has several peculiarities, gross gendered inequalities, and notions of cis-gendered male heteronormative superiority. To no extent can it be called uniform or civil. Nonetheless, a particular peculiarity that catches attention which is invisible in the Indian jurisprudence of personal laws finds home in the Goan UCC- pre-nuptial agreements. 

Pre-nuptial agreements or “Ante-nuptial Conventions” as provided in Section V of the Code are agreements entered into by spouses to stipulate their assets for the purposes of protecting their wealth from the ‘economically inferior’ spouse. The general matrimonial sphere of India finds such agreements as void but may lend an evidentiary status. The Goan UCC contrarily finds such agreements valid as long as they are not in contravention with the Code and are recorded by way of a public deed (Article 1097 of the Code). The ensemble attempts to displace the state law with the contractual terms agreed upon in the event of divorce or dissolution by the death of a spouse. This practice is commonplace in the western legal system. In lieu of such an agreement, there is an obvious waiver of protections ordained by the state laws or customary practices. 

The concept of pre-nuptial agreements is not alien to India. One of the first cases recording such a reality was the case of Hamidunnessa Biwi v. Zohiruddin Sheikh, (1890) and Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basant Kumar Singh, (1901) where the Courts held agreements were invalid on grounds of public policy. However, there is a contrarian position held in cases like Nawab Khwaja Md. Khan v. Nawab Husaini Begam, (1910) where the Court found such agreements as valid and good in law. Section 40 of the Divorce Act, 1869 which governs the dissolution of Christian marriages requires the Court to look into the existence of any such pre-nuptial agreements. In any case, such validity of the agreement was not accorded to Hindu marriages where marriage isn’t viewed as a contractual relationship, but rather a sacrament. Supreme Court on several occasions has observed that “public policy” does not have an ascertainable form but rather, changes with the change in time. At this juncture, it becomes pertinent if the lens of public policy should change concerning pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreements. 

In the Indian matrimonial context, apart from the predilections of religion, customs, kinship, dowry, and class, the wealth distribution or the wealth gap always favours the man in the relationship putting the female counterpart in the ‘economically inferior’ and precarious position. More often than not, such economic vulnerability of the female counterpart is due to the lack of autonomy in matrimonial relations tinted with patriarchal notions of ‘bread-winners’ and ‘homemakers’ apart from the obvious lack of choices in making life decisions before or after marriage. Institutions of religion or customs do not seem to offer much reprieve either. Kerala HC set such a precedent in Ranjith P.C. v. Asha Nair where it was set that it is reasonable to expect household work and chores from a daughter-in-law. 

Given this context parallel to societal import for the importance of marriage, women would always be, evidently, at a more vulnerable position. Since most pre-nuptial agreements are for wealth and asset protection in event of dissolution, they would always be in favour of the ‘economically superior’ spouse. Conventionally, that would be at the expense of the woman. It would always be the husband at a dominant position, given the interpretation to the husband’s position in the family unit; regardless of the financial situation to set the terms of the agreement and forgo the protection of laws and customs set in place. This adversely impacts the social and economic well-being of the woman in the relationship and contributes to financial vulnerability. Furthermore, it would also amplify the magnitude of the unequal distribution on the vectors of gender.  

This sense of entitlement can be harkened back to the labour theory of value of Karl Marx. The doctrine simplistically argues that what is created by the labour of the person is to be owned by them due to the input of labour power. This was Marx’s blue-collar notion of work which now cannot be considered sound. What is pertinent herein is the feminist and the moral critique of the proposition which questions the narrow view of what is considered labour, power, and productivity. To analyse this, a divorce case of 1986 in New York can be taken into consideration. A man, who was pursuing his medical studies gets married to a woman in an arranged setting. As a commonly expected practice, the wife was expected to stay at home and take care of the household. While the wife carried out such duties, the husband was able to finish his education and build a successful practice of 14 years. Events occurred which resulted in a divorce. The husband argued that he does not owe anything to his wife considering his practice was built on independent labour power and participation in the market. The Court disagreeing held that the wife contributed value to his practice and thus, had ownership interests in his practice given her participation. The wife’s work was embedded in the successful medical practice. Thusly, she was awarded 40% interest in the medical practice as a divorce settlement. 

Devaluation of a woman’s work in the household and entitlement of a man in the family over assets is the oldest, most sexist story of humankind. It is a story sewn so deep into the Indian social fabric that it seems and appears normal. It is the living embodiment of compelled subservience. In a marriage, especially in an Indian context, women are the minority in wealth holding, raising the balance of convenience in favour of men to negotiate and disenfranchise their spouses. Where superficially, it may seem like a move of empowerment, the ground reality screams a different story of exploitation. Sabina Martins, a women’s rights activist observed that “…women across religions being thrown out of their marital homes within months of marriage”. Adjunctively, the waiver of an equitable division of property, or “communion of assets” i.e., equal distribution of property leaves the woman at the mercy of her husband. The Government was recently considering the incorporation of such pre-nuptial agreements into personal laws for women empowerment. Whether such prerogative is right has been answered by the arguments abovementioned. The Courts, as the sole arbiter of truth, with the knowledge of historical injustices and jurisprudence must always consider gender as a variable, especially in the domain of marriage. A supposed reflection that such agreements could offer an ounce of equality is not sufficient cause for reconsideration of “public policy”. The terms of any premarital agreement will always echo the superior bargaining power and resources of the prospective husband. 

Biography: Sayan Dasgupta is a 3rd-year law student pursuing a 5-year integrated degree of B.A., LL.B. with corporate honors. He takes a special interest in constitutional law and public policy. and can be reached via mail or at LinkedIn.

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