Tag:

Kerala High Court

Mehreen Mander

Last week, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mat. Appeal No. 151 of 2015 held that marital rape is a good ground to claim divorce. The Bench comprising Justice Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Kauser Edappagath dismissed a set of appeals filed by the husband challenging the decision of the Family Court, recognizing that “a husband’s licentious disposition disregarding the autonomy of the wife is marital rape” which amounts as physical and mental cruelty. The appeals were preferred by the husband seeking against a judgment of the Family court granting a divorce on grounds of cruelty. The husband’s petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights had also been dismissed.

Facts

The facts of the case were as follows: The appellant-husband upon failure of a business started subjecting the wife to constant harassment demanding money from her family, and on various occasions the father of the wife has given him approximately 77 lakhs. Further, the respondent had been subjected to physical harassment and sexual perversion. The appellant husband has committed forceful sex on numerous occasions – when she was sick and bedridden, when his mother expired and even in front of their daughter. She had also been subjected to unnatural sex against her will. Further, the husband was in an illicit relationship with the caretaker of the apartment. The family court had granted divorce on grounds of mental and physical cruelty.

Observations of the Court

The Division Bench while rendering its judgment observed that “sex in married life must reflect the intimacy of the spouse”, and in the present case, the sexual perversions the respondent was subject to was in disregard of her wishes and feelings. Further, the Division Bench observed that marital rape is premised on the patriarchal notion of the husband that the wife of the body owes to him. Such a notion, has no place in a modern social jurisprudence which insists on treating the spouses in marriage as equal partners.

The court recognized that “marital privacy” is connected to individual autonomy and any intrusion into this space would diminish this privacy. That a violation of bodily integrity is a violation of individual autonomy, which is protected as a fundamental right. Thus, the court recognized that “treating wife’s body as something owing to husband and committing sexual act against her will” is marital rape which is to be construed as an invasion of marital privacy. The Bench acknowledged that while marital rape is not criminalized in the Indian penal jurisprudence, that by itself does not deter the court from recognizing it as a ground for divorce. Marital rape essentially constitutes physical and mental cruelty, which is a ground for divorce under section 13(1)(i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and Section 27 (1) (d) of Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed.

The Position of Law on Marital Rape

The Indian state is one among only 36 countries that refuse to bring marital rape under the purview of penal consequences. Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 that defines rape categorically excludes instances of sexual intercourse by a husband with his wife who is aged above 15 years. The age of consent was later raised to eighteen years by the Criminal Amendment Act of 2013. The Supreme Court in Independent Thought v. Union of India also held that a girl child below 18 years of age was incapable of giving consent for sexual intercourse. The courts have however refrained from getting into the question of illegality of marital rape. This implies that adult wives can still be legally raped by their husbands under the current penal law in India.

The Justice Verma Committee set up in the aftermath of the 2012 Nirbhaya case recommended criminalization of marital rape. In 2017, a parliamentary panel set up to consider the Committee’s recommendations observed that criminalizing marital rape would bring the entire family system under great stress. Thus, it has refused to remove the exception in Section 375 which allows the husband to legally rape his major wife. The government has repeatedly insisted the sacrosanct nature of the institution of marriage to justify the exception.

It is pertinent to juxtapose such conceptions of marriage against cases where rapists are asked to marry rape survivors. Recently, while hearing a case against Mohit Subhash Chavan, a public servant who was accused to repeatedly raping a minor girl was asked by former Chief Justice of India SA Bobde if he intended to marry her. This is not an isolated instance. Rapists often marry the survivors to escape penal consequences under the persuasion of village elders or relatives. Judges too are persuaded by the arguments of stigma and honor. In some cases, rapists have deserted the survivor after marriage.

The apex court in judgments like Lillu Rajesh and others v State of Haryana has observed that a women’s supreme honor is “her dignity, honour, reputation and chastity.” That this supreme honor is defiled and degraded by the act of rape and thus renders the victim helpless and unmarriageable, is repeated in many judgments such as Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana. Courts routinely advise marriage between the rapist and the survivor as a compromise – to save the woman from the resultant stigma and social rejection, and the man from punishment, especially in those cases where the victim has become pregnant.

Conclusion

It is very telling about the Indian jurisprudence that considers marital rape is essential to preserve the sanctity of the institution of marriage on one hand, and makes the rape survivor marry her rapist on the other. The jurisprudence at some level recognizes that a woman must suffer the worst form of degradation and harassment as a part of the regular course of marriage. The cost of preserving the institution of marriage must be the woman’s autonomy, and such cost must be paid by what the court itself recognizes as the worst form of defiling of her “supreme honour.” The only way to contradict this inference is to consider the married woman as the chattel of her husband, which is an understanding grossly violative of the fundamental right of equality.

In light of this, the Kerala High Court judgment becomes important. It recognizes autonomy as a part of privacy which is a fundamental right, and extends it to the private sphere of marriage and household which state has often refused to do. It in fact goes a step further in acknowledging the legal heteronomy and paternalism in the family and divorce laws of the country. Recognising marital rape as grounds for divorce opens the door for many women who suffered without recourse so far.

0 comments 24 views
4 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail

Author: Sayan Dasgupta

The sporadic distribution of persons, identity, culture, language has always been a part of the Indic civilization. This heterogeneity implied a myriad of personal laws; both codified and uncodified. Where such diversity is engrained in the social fabric of India, such diversity could also mean plurality of gendered injustices. Delhi High Court on this note grappled and encouraged the Centre to act on the idea of Uniform Civil Code such that it doesn’t “remain a mere hope”. However, the Courts’ activism is not recent. Kerala HC in Agnes Alias Kunjumol v. Regeena Thomas also highlighted the need for such a legislation for subsistence of marital institution.    

The tapestry of Bharat and its consonance with debate of UCC is a stuck gramophone. Where one camp argues for uniformity and homogeneity of personal laws, another camp argues that it would bludgeon religious freedom. However, a fruitful discourse is impossible without a substance of the legislation or a bill to test the veracity of either of those camps. Notwithstanding that, what can be subjected to a litmus test is the Goan Uniform Civil Code which has been lauded by the former Chief Justice of India. The Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 has several peculiarities, gross gendered inequalities, and notions of cis-gendered male heteronormative superiority. To no extent can it be called uniform or civil. Nonetheless, a particular peculiarity that catches attention which is invisible in the Indian jurisprudence of personal laws finds home in the Goan UCC- pre-nuptial agreements. 

Pre-nuptial agreements or “Ante-nuptial Conventions” as provided in Section V of the Code are agreements entered into by spouses to stipulate their assets for the purposes of protecting their wealth from the ‘economically inferior’ spouse. The general matrimonial sphere of India finds such agreements as void but may lend an evidentiary status. The Goan UCC contrarily finds such agreements valid as long as they are not in contravention with the Code and are recorded by way of a public deed (Article 1097 of the Code). The ensemble attempts to displace the state law with the contractual terms agreed upon in the event of divorce or dissolution by the death of a spouse. This practice is commonplace in the western legal system. In lieu of such an agreement, there is an obvious waiver of protections ordained by the state laws or customary practices. 

The concept of pre-nuptial agreements is not alien to India. One of the first cases recording such a reality was the case of Hamidunnessa Biwi v. Zohiruddin Sheikh, (1890) and Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basant Kumar Singh, (1901) where the Courts held agreements were invalid on grounds of public policy. However, there is a contrarian position held in cases like Nawab Khwaja Md. Khan v. Nawab Husaini Begam, (1910) where the Court found such agreements as valid and good in law. Section 40 of the Divorce Act, 1869 which governs the dissolution of Christian marriages requires the Court to look into the existence of any such pre-nuptial agreements. In any case, such validity of the agreement was not accorded to Hindu marriages where marriage isn’t viewed as a contractual relationship, but rather a sacrament. Supreme Court on several occasions has observed that “public policy” does not have an ascertainable form but rather, changes with the change in time. At this juncture, it becomes pertinent if the lens of public policy should change concerning pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreements. 

In the Indian matrimonial context, apart from the predilections of religion, customs, kinship, dowry, and class, the wealth distribution or the wealth gap always favours the man in the relationship putting the female counterpart in the ‘economically inferior’ and precarious position. More often than not, such economic vulnerability of the female counterpart is due to the lack of autonomy in matrimonial relations tinted with patriarchal notions of ‘bread-winners’ and ‘homemakers’ apart from the obvious lack of choices in making life decisions before or after marriage. Institutions of religion or customs do not seem to offer much reprieve either. Kerala HC set such a precedent in Ranjith P.C. v. Asha Nair where it was set that it is reasonable to expect household work and chores from a daughter-in-law. 

Given this context parallel to societal import for the importance of marriage, women would always be, evidently, at a more vulnerable position. Since most pre-nuptial agreements are for wealth and asset protection in event of dissolution, they would always be in favour of the ‘economically superior’ spouse. Conventionally, that would be at the expense of the woman. It would always be the husband at a dominant position, given the interpretation to the husband’s position in the family unit; regardless of the financial situation to set the terms of the agreement and forgo the protection of laws and customs set in place. This adversely impacts the social and economic well-being of the woman in the relationship and contributes to financial vulnerability. Furthermore, it would also amplify the magnitude of the unequal distribution on the vectors of gender.  

This sense of entitlement can be harkened back to the labour theory of value of Karl Marx. The doctrine simplistically argues that what is created by the labour of the person is to be owned by them due to the input of labour power. This was Marx’s blue-collar notion of work which now cannot be considered sound. What is pertinent herein is the feminist and the moral critique of the proposition which questions the narrow view of what is considered labour, power, and productivity. To analyse this, a divorce case of 1986 in New York can be taken into consideration. A man, who was pursuing his medical studies gets married to a woman in an arranged setting. As a commonly expected practice, the wife was expected to stay at home and take care of the household. While the wife carried out such duties, the husband was able to finish his education and build a successful practice of 14 years. Events occurred which resulted in a divorce. The husband argued that he does not owe anything to his wife considering his practice was built on independent labour power and participation in the market. The Court disagreeing held that the wife contributed value to his practice and thus, had ownership interests in his practice given her participation. The wife’s work was embedded in the successful medical practice. Thusly, she was awarded 40% interest in the medical practice as a divorce settlement. 

Devaluation of a woman’s work in the household and entitlement of a man in the family over assets is the oldest, most sexist story of humankind. It is a story sewn so deep into the Indian social fabric that it seems and appears normal. It is the living embodiment of compelled subservience. In a marriage, especially in an Indian context, women are the minority in wealth holding, raising the balance of convenience in favour of men to negotiate and disenfranchise their spouses. Where superficially, it may seem like a move of empowerment, the ground reality screams a different story of exploitation. Sabina Martins, a women’s rights activist observed that “…women across religions being thrown out of their marital homes within months of marriage”. Adjunctively, the waiver of an equitable division of property, or “communion of assets” i.e., equal distribution of property leaves the woman at the mercy of her husband. The Government was recently considering the incorporation of such pre-nuptial agreements into personal laws for women empowerment. Whether such prerogative is right has been answered by the arguments abovementioned. The Courts, as the sole arbiter of truth, with the knowledge of historical injustices and jurisprudence must always consider gender as a variable, especially in the domain of marriage. A supposed reflection that such agreements could offer an ounce of equality is not sufficient cause for reconsideration of “public policy”. The terms of any premarital agreement will always echo the superior bargaining power and resources of the prospective husband. 

Biography: Sayan Dasgupta is a 3rd-year law student pursuing a 5-year integrated degree of B.A., LL.B. with corporate honors. He takes a special interest in constitutional law and public policy. and can be reached via mail or at LinkedIn.

0 comments 26 views
3 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
The Womb - Encouraging, Empowering and Celebrating Women.

The Womb is an e-platform to bring together a community of people who are passionate about women rights and gender justice. It hopes to create space for women issues in the media which are oft neglected and mostly negative. For our boys and girls to grow up in a world where everyone has equal opportunity irrespective of gender, it is important to create this space for women issues and women stories, to offset the patriarchal tilt in our mainstream media and society.

@2025 – The Womb. All Rights Reserved. Designed and Developed by The Womb Team

Are you sure want to unlock this post?
Unlock left : 0
Are you sure want to cancel subscription?