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By Pooja Bhattacharjee

Rape has been defined under Section 375 of the IPC (Indian Penal Code, 1860),  which states that rape is said to have been committed when a man has sexual intercourse with a woman against her will, without her consent, by coercion, misrepresentation, or fraud or at a time when she has been intoxicated or duped or is of unsound mental health and in any case if she is under 18 years of age.  Rape is a form of gender-motivated violence in India. In the case of Sakshi v. UOI, the Supreme Court shed light on the definition of rape and held that only penial and vaginal penetration will be considered as rape within the purview of Section 375 of the IPC, thus narrowing down the scope of sexual intercourse as defined in the IPC. However, in 2012, a bench of justices Swatanter Kumar and Gyan Sudha Misra held that even if there is no penetration, it does not necessarily mean that there is no rape, while upholding the conviction of a man for raping a 11-year-old girl, despite there being no evidence of penetration. (The Hindu)

The Verma Committee had recommended that non penetrative acts against women, like stalking and groping, which are also a violation of woman’s bodily integrity and sexual autonomy, should be termed as sexual assault and be punished as rape. The legislature, however, did not accept the recommendation and retained the offence of ‘outraging the modesty of a woman,’ which is the provision under which all non-penetrative sexual acts continue to be prosecuted under Section 354 of the IPC. (THE WIRE)

To prove that consent was absent, the law’s aim should be to reduce ambiguity and alter definitions to mitigate the historic imbalance of credibility afforded to males but not to females. The most important factor to be determined in a rape is whether the woman consented to the sexual act. The law presumes that the accused is innocent. The burden is on the prosecution- victim to prove beyond reasonable doubt that consent was absent. Under Section 375, ‘willingness to participate in the specific sexual act’ can be conveyed ‘through words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication.’ The focus is more often on if these ‘gestures’ occurred and not on what they meant. 

Two recent cases shows that the Indian judiciary needs to be more sensitive in dealing with rape cases and not fall back on erstwhile sexist and misogynistic views that have emerged in numerous judgments. 

In the Guahati Rape Case, the Gauhati High Court granted bail to Utsav Kadam, a 21-year-old accused of rape on the ground that the he is a talented student and is the state’s ‘future asset.’ The police had arrested the accused, a student of IIT Guwahati on April 3, for allegedly sexually assaulting a female student of the institute on March 28. The bench of Justice Ajit Borthakur in an order passed on 13 August granting bail to Utsav Kadam, observed, “as the investigation in the case is completed and both the victim and the accused are the state’s future assets being talented students pursuing technical courses at the I.I.T., Guwahati, who are young in the age group of 19 to 21 years only and further, they are being hailed from two different states, a continuation of detention of the accused in the interest of trial of the case, if charges are framed, may not be necessary”. The order was passed despite the fact that the court noted that there is a clear prima facie case against Kadam. 

Last year, it was reported that a Civil Court in the Araria district of Bihar had sent a gang rape survivor to jail on grounds of disrupting court proceedings. Her only crime was having an emotional outburst and a nervous breakdown that emanated from the Court’s request to repeat her trauma over and over again. What seems to be a natural reaction for any rape survivor was misconstrued as ‘contempt of court’. The judiciary’s response to rape cases, specifically, rape survivors seem to fluctuate between insensitive and thoughtless to sexist and misogynistic. (ThePrint 2020)

In India, the class, and caste of the victim are used as means to discredit the victim. The colonizers used caste or class to gauge the reliability of the version of events stated by survivors and this is being continued to date. The rape adjudication cases in India involving a breach of promise to marry are also revealing.  In Kunal Mandaliya v. State of Maharashtra. 

Justice Mridula Bhatkar observed that an educated woman could not have been deceived, and thus was not raped on the pretext of marriage. The judgement read:

The prosecutrix at the time of filing the complaint was 30 years old and was nearly 25 to 26 years old when the first incident of sexual intercourse took place. Thus, she was aware of the consequences of keeping sexual relations with a man and she was also aware that there may be differences between two persons and they may find each other compatible. The girl was highly educated and also 25 years old. Therefore, the consent cannot be said to have been obtained by fraud.

The court’s comment on consent shows how in the absence of an affirmative standard, a negative standard invalidates the experience of the woman and improperly shifts the responsibility of the assault away from the perpetrator and onto the victim. 

Marital rape refers to sexual intercourse with one’s spouse without their consent. Recently, the Chhattisgarh High Court held that sexual intercourse by husband does not amount to rape, even if it’s by force. (Today 2021) 

The law, as inhumane as it is, however, is being defended by some eminent jurists who are in favour of leaving the provision untouched in order to protect the ‘Indian family values.’  It is important to acknowledge, however, that those assigned the female sex at birth are not the only survivors of rape in India, often, nonconformity with gender boundaries not only functions as a basis for sex crimes, including rape but also makes it harder for survivors to seek help. Section 375 of the IPC only conceptualizes the perpetrator as male and the victim as female. Its exclusivity in nature leaves out a large section of society who are being violated and are left with no discourse of getting justice. 

The status quo burdens victims and exonerates perpetrators of responsibility in sexual interactions. Indian statutes, legal decisions, and commentaries condemning rape primarily focus on it as a crime that lowers a woman’s dignity and scars her reputation, rather than a crime violative of a woman’s selfhood, individuality, or autonomy. 

The accounting of traditional notions of what an ‘Indian woman’ is and their defined ‘behaviors’ are, should be discarded. Even though change is visible, an overturning of the current structures will be brought about through a normative reconstruction of our laws and our social rationality only when people realize why the current laws are problematic and ancient and understand why new amendments to these laws are necessary.

It is necessary to take legal recourse if you’ve been abused of sexual harassment or have witnessed someone getting abused. Consecutively, you can register your complaint at the National Commission for Women   as investigations by the police will be expedited and monitored. 

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Author: Sayan Dasgupta

The sporadic distribution of persons, identity, culture, language has always been a part of the Indic civilization. This heterogeneity implied a myriad of personal laws; both codified and uncodified. Where such diversity is engrained in the social fabric of India, such diversity could also mean plurality of gendered injustices. Delhi High Court on this note grappled and encouraged the Centre to act on the idea of Uniform Civil Code such that it doesn’t “remain a mere hope”. However, the Courts’ activism is not recent. Kerala HC in Agnes Alias Kunjumol v. Regeena Thomas also highlighted the need for such a legislation for subsistence of marital institution.    

The tapestry of Bharat and its consonance with debate of UCC is a stuck gramophone. Where one camp argues for uniformity and homogeneity of personal laws, another camp argues that it would bludgeon religious freedom. However, a fruitful discourse is impossible without a substance of the legislation or a bill to test the veracity of either of those camps. Notwithstanding that, what can be subjected to a litmus test is the Goan Uniform Civil Code which has been lauded by the former Chief Justice of India. The Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 has several peculiarities, gross gendered inequalities, and notions of cis-gendered male heteronormative superiority. To no extent can it be called uniform or civil. Nonetheless, a particular peculiarity that catches attention which is invisible in the Indian jurisprudence of personal laws finds home in the Goan UCC- pre-nuptial agreements. 

Pre-nuptial agreements or “Ante-nuptial Conventions” as provided in Section V of the Code are agreements entered into by spouses to stipulate their assets for the purposes of protecting their wealth from the ‘economically inferior’ spouse. The general matrimonial sphere of India finds such agreements as void but may lend an evidentiary status. The Goan UCC contrarily finds such agreements valid as long as they are not in contravention with the Code and are recorded by way of a public deed (Article 1097 of the Code). The ensemble attempts to displace the state law with the contractual terms agreed upon in the event of divorce or dissolution by the death of a spouse. This practice is commonplace in the western legal system. In lieu of such an agreement, there is an obvious waiver of protections ordained by the state laws or customary practices. 

The concept of pre-nuptial agreements is not alien to India. One of the first cases recording such a reality was the case of Hamidunnessa Biwi v. Zohiruddin Sheikh, (1890) and Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basant Kumar Singh, (1901) where the Courts held agreements were invalid on grounds of public policy. However, there is a contrarian position held in cases like Nawab Khwaja Md. Khan v. Nawab Husaini Begam, (1910) where the Court found such agreements as valid and good in law. Section 40 of the Divorce Act, 1869 which governs the dissolution of Christian marriages requires the Court to look into the existence of any such pre-nuptial agreements. In any case, such validity of the agreement was not accorded to Hindu marriages where marriage isn’t viewed as a contractual relationship, but rather a sacrament. Supreme Court on several occasions has observed that “public policy” does not have an ascertainable form but rather, changes with the change in time. At this juncture, it becomes pertinent if the lens of public policy should change concerning pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreements. 

In the Indian matrimonial context, apart from the predilections of religion, customs, kinship, dowry, and class, the wealth distribution or the wealth gap always favours the man in the relationship putting the female counterpart in the ‘economically inferior’ and precarious position. More often than not, such economic vulnerability of the female counterpart is due to the lack of autonomy in matrimonial relations tinted with patriarchal notions of ‘bread-winners’ and ‘homemakers’ apart from the obvious lack of choices in making life decisions before or after marriage. Institutions of religion or customs do not seem to offer much reprieve either. Kerala HC set such a precedent in Ranjith P.C. v. Asha Nair where it was set that it is reasonable to expect household work and chores from a daughter-in-law. 

Given this context parallel to societal import for the importance of marriage, women would always be, evidently, at a more vulnerable position. Since most pre-nuptial agreements are for wealth and asset protection in event of dissolution, they would always be in favour of the ‘economically superior’ spouse. Conventionally, that would be at the expense of the woman. It would always be the husband at a dominant position, given the interpretation to the husband’s position in the family unit; regardless of the financial situation to set the terms of the agreement and forgo the protection of laws and customs set in place. This adversely impacts the social and economic well-being of the woman in the relationship and contributes to financial vulnerability. Furthermore, it would also amplify the magnitude of the unequal distribution on the vectors of gender.  

This sense of entitlement can be harkened back to the labour theory of value of Karl Marx. The doctrine simplistically argues that what is created by the labour of the person is to be owned by them due to the input of labour power. This was Marx’s blue-collar notion of work which now cannot be considered sound. What is pertinent herein is the feminist and the moral critique of the proposition which questions the narrow view of what is considered labour, power, and productivity. To analyse this, a divorce case of 1986 in New York can be taken into consideration. A man, who was pursuing his medical studies gets married to a woman in an arranged setting. As a commonly expected practice, the wife was expected to stay at home and take care of the household. While the wife carried out such duties, the husband was able to finish his education and build a successful practice of 14 years. Events occurred which resulted in a divorce. The husband argued that he does not owe anything to his wife considering his practice was built on independent labour power and participation in the market. The Court disagreeing held that the wife contributed value to his practice and thus, had ownership interests in his practice given her participation. The wife’s work was embedded in the successful medical practice. Thusly, she was awarded 40% interest in the medical practice as a divorce settlement. 

Devaluation of a woman’s work in the household and entitlement of a man in the family over assets is the oldest, most sexist story of humankind. It is a story sewn so deep into the Indian social fabric that it seems and appears normal. It is the living embodiment of compelled subservience. In a marriage, especially in an Indian context, women are the minority in wealth holding, raising the balance of convenience in favour of men to negotiate and disenfranchise their spouses. Where superficially, it may seem like a move of empowerment, the ground reality screams a different story of exploitation. Sabina Martins, a women’s rights activist observed that “…women across religions being thrown out of their marital homes within months of marriage”. Adjunctively, the waiver of an equitable division of property, or “communion of assets” i.e., equal distribution of property leaves the woman at the mercy of her husband. The Government was recently considering the incorporation of such pre-nuptial agreements into personal laws for women empowerment. Whether such prerogative is right has been answered by the arguments abovementioned. The Courts, as the sole arbiter of truth, with the knowledge of historical injustices and jurisprudence must always consider gender as a variable, especially in the domain of marriage. A supposed reflection that such agreements could offer an ounce of equality is not sufficient cause for reconsideration of “public policy”. The terms of any premarital agreement will always echo the superior bargaining power and resources of the prospective husband. 

Biography: Sayan Dasgupta is a 3rd-year law student pursuing a 5-year integrated degree of B.A., LL.B. with corporate honors. He takes a special interest in constitutional law and public policy. and can be reached via mail or at LinkedIn.

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By Vandana Bharti 

Despite 75 years of independence, the social status of women in India still stands in shadows. Grievous crimes and alarming rates of pending cases portray the loopholes in the legal machinery of the Indian legal system. One such appalling act is that of Rape – where the dignity and self-respect of a woman is bruised beyond contemplation. When such an act occurs behind four-walls in a matrimonial home, it is known as Marital Rape. Where the spouse engages with his/her better half in a forceful, non-consensual sex it is termed as Marital Rape.  

A legally sanctioned contract between a man and a woman forms marriage. In India, the legality of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman gives the husband leverage to consider the consent of his wife perpetual in the course of marriage. 

Indian Legislation On The Offence Of Rape:

Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) states – A man has committed rape if he had sexual intercourse with a woman against her will, without her consent, with her consent but by putting her in danger or threatening her, with her consent whom she believes that she was lawfully wedded to, with her consent but the consent was given in an unconscious state, and with her consent when she is under 15 years of age.  Nowhere does this specify the essential elements and the repercussions of committing marital rape. 

As per Indian Penal Code, husband can be convicted on grounds of marital rape only when:

  • The wife is 15 years of age or below; and is punishable by imprisonment for up to 2 years or fine, or both.
  • When the wife is below 12 years of age, offence punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 7 years but which may extend to life or for a term extending up to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine.
  • Rape of a judicially separated wife, offence punishable with imprisonment up to 2 years and fine.      
  • Rape of wife of above 15 years in age is not punishable.  

Precedents In the Law

In the Harvinder Kaur v. Harmandar Singh case (AIR 1984 Delhi 66 ), the Delhi High Court stated that the interference of the Constitution in household matters would destroy the marriage.  

The court stated, “In the privacy of the home and the married life neither Article 21 [No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law] nor Article 14 [The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India] have any place.

In 2019, while introducing the ‘The Women’s Sexual, Reproductive and Menstrual Rights Bill, 2018’ Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha, said, “‘Marital rape is not about sex, but about violence; it is not about marriage, but about lack of consent.”

Naval Rahul Shiralkar, Advocate at High Court of Bombay Judicature at Nagpur, said, “Courts have various methods to identify marital rape and have given strict punishments but due to the lack of a law against a crime like that, the judiciary is bound to not admit ‘forceful intercourse by a man upon his wife’ as marital rape.” 

Shiralkar said that many of the marital rape cases went unreported in India. He added, “There are at least 5-6 cases reported every year in Nagpur Family Court which are pending litigation.”

Saranya S. Hegde, President of the Mahila Dakshata Samiti, Bangalore, said that husbands often thought that they could do everything with their wives because society and marital laws supported that. “The helpless and dependent suffer in silence.

Hegde said, “If a woman goes to a [family] court, the judge often favours the husband and asks the wife to adjust.” In her more than 15 years of experience, Hegde said she had seen women committing suicide due to the mental torture they went through because of marital rapes and domestic violence.

Kamlesh Premi, Counsellor at home at the Centre for Social Research, said the court procedures took almost five or seven years. Having been a counsellor for more than 20 years, Premi said that the judiciary system was too lengthy.

First, the woman has to complain to the Crime against Women Cell and get counselled. Then if she wants, she has to file an FIR (First Information Report) under Section 498 (A) (Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) of the IPC, which in itself is quite a lengthy procedure. And at the end, even after an investment of at least five years and financial resources, the court would either ask her to adjust or maybe get her a divorce with maintenance. Hence, a lot of women compromise or either go for mutual divorce. “Therefore, there is a lot of under-reportage for marital rapes,” she added.

“It is in rare cases that a wife asks for a divorce or maintenance,” Premi said. “The biggest problem is that the husbands treat wives as private property. They think they own her.”

Dr. Ratna Purwar, a gynaecologist in Lucknow, said women often complain about the presence of vaginal or anal wounds in such severity that could substantiate rape. She added that, when men are asked to abstain from forceful sex with their spouse, the most common answer is, “Why did I marry her then?”

The financial dependency of women becomes a prime reason for all the physical and verbal abuse endurance. It had become normal despite the mental health depletion and trauma. Marriages in India have the concept of ‘implicit consent’ to sex and women sadly or happily comply and do not report it. 

In the Anuja Kapur vs Union of India Through Secretary case of 2019 (W.P. (C) – 258/2017) , a PIL was filed asking the Delhi High Court to make guidelines and laws on marital rape. The court replied that drafting of the laws was the work of the legislature and not the judiciary. “The court is more concerned with the interpretation of the law rather than the drafting of laws.”

In the Nimeshbhai Bharat Bhai Desai vs. State of Gujrat case of 2018 (2018 SCC OnLine Guj 732), the Gujarat High Court admitted that marital rape was not just a concept and the notion of ‘implied consent’ in marriage should be dropped. The law must protect bodily autonomy of every woman (married or unmarried).

However, in Independent Thought vs Union of India on October 11, 2017, the Supreme Court stated that sexual intercourse with a girl, below 18 years of age, was rape regardless of her marital status.

Supreme Court of India, in the case of Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 800, read down Exception 2 to Section 375, IPC as being violative of Article 14 and 21 of Indian Constitution. 

In 2017, the Daily reported a 2014 study by International Centre for Research on Women and United Nations Population Fund on 9,500 respondents in seven states of India. The report concluded that 17% of women received spousal violence while 31% (one in three) men admitted to committing sexual violence against their wives.

In 2016, Maneka Gandhi, then minister for child and women development, said that the ‘concept of marital rape’ that was understood internationally could not be applied to India considering the levels of illiteracy and poverty.

In 2016, the U.N. Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended that marital rape be criminalized in India. After that recommendation, a question was raised in the upper house of Parliament asking what action had been taken. Haribhai Parathibhai Chaudhary, then minister of state for home, replied, “It is considered that the concept of marital rape, as understood internationally, cannot be suitably applied in the Indian context due to various factors, including level of education, illiteracy, poverty, myriad social customs and values, religious beliefs, mindset of the society to treat the marriage as a sacrament.” This response was repeated literally by Minister Gandhi in the Parliament. 

In the year 2015, the RIT Foundation filed a Public Interest Litigation in the Delhi High Court challenging the exemption of marital rape in Section 375 of the IPC. The challenge is on the basis of Article 14, Article 15 (a fundamental right prohibits discrimination by the state against any citizen on grounds ‘only’ of religion, caste, race, sex, and place of birth), Article 19 (freedom of speech which is the right to express one’s opinion freely without any fear through oral/ written/ electronic/ broadcasting/ press), and Article 21 of the Indian constitution.

Justice Verma Committee report (2013) recommended the discarding of the exception of marital rape. Providentially, in November 2017 a division bench of the  

The Law Commission of India in its 172nd Report considered the issue of marital rape, but chose to ignore the voices that demanded the deletion of Exception 2 to s. 375 IPC on the ground that “it may lead to excessive interference with marital relationship” and may destroy the institution of marriage.

In the 42nd report by the Law Commission, it was proposed that criminal liability be attached to the intercourse of a spouse with his/her minor husband/wife. But the committee banished the recommendation stating that the sexual intercourse between a man and a woman can never impose criminal liability on the husband as sex is the parcel in a marriage. 

The Supreme Court, while deciding the issue of marital rape of girls below the age of 18 years, made certain observations and comments that are equally applicable and relevant to married women over 18 years of age.

One of the foremost issues is that of the right to bodily integrity and reproductive rights. While referring to various precedents, the Court found that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of “personal liberty” as under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right, in effect, would include a woman’s right to refuse participation in sexual activity.

The Supreme Court also noted views expressed by the Justice (Retd.) JS Verma Committee, where reference was made to a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights which concluded that a rapist remains a “rapist regardless of his relationship with the victim”.

According to the 2015-16 National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 31% of married women have experienced violence – physical or sexual. The NFHS reported that about 4% of women were forced to have sexual intercourse when they did not want to, 2.1% to perform sexual acts they did not want to, and 3% were threatened to perform sexual acts they did not want to.  

In 2015, two separate pleas were submitted to the Supreme Court asking for the law to be amended by deleting the marital rape exception. In the first, the petitioner, a 28-year-old, had already filed charges against her husband for domestic violence (a civil, not criminal offense) as well as “cruelty.” She used her maiden name, Reema Gaur, to shield her identity.

She wanted to bring him to justice for repeatedly raping her. “The law as it stands today amounts to a state-sanctioned license granted to the husband to violate the sexual autonomy of his own lawfully wedded wife,” the plea stated.

Appearing on TV, heavily veiled, wearing spectacles that magnified her eyes, Gaur talked about her marriage. “Every night post the wedding was a nightmare for me. … He would never even ask my permission,” she said. “He used to beat me up, insert artificial [objects] in me. At some point I was in such a condition I was not even able to walk,” she said, her voice breaking with tears. On the night she decided to leave, she said, “He hit me 18 times on my head with a box and a torchlight. And then he inserted the torchlight in my vagina.

Bleeding and in a semiconscious state, she called her mother for rescue. The bleeding lasted for two months. In the year she was married, when Gaur tried to talk to her in-laws and her parents, “The only thing they told me is, ‘Try to adjust.’

In 2014, Akash Gupta of the Rice Institute, a non-profit organisation reported, that the number of spousal violence received by the wives was 40 times more than that received by non-intimate partners. 

Deepika Narayan Bharadwaj, a film maker and activist believe the state does not have the potency to support women if they are to seek divorce on grounds of marital rape. “It’s naive to say women have complete right of consent and rights over their body, when the truth is they’re dependent on their husbands for everything, financially, emotionally,” says Bhardwaj. 

Trisha Shetty, founder of She Says, a website for information and action on sexual crimes against women argues that protection from Marital Rape is not a western issue that needs solving rather it is a basic human right. People in India are of the opinion that sexual abuse and marital rape only happens to the poor, the fallacy needs to be broken. “That whole assumption that you’re making laws for people who don’t understand is nonsense. Everyone understands the concept of consent, of saying, ‘No.’” says Trisha. 

She Says and several NGOs, including Jagori (which in Hindi means “awaken, women!”), have organized workshops and other programs to help women speak out about the sexual abuse and rape. Online, there are additional resources, such as this Marathi language effort to educate about consent via two folk dancers having a musical discussion about the meaning of “yes” and “no.” The government has even set up an emergency hotline, staffed by women, to field calls from women who need police assistance as well as resources and instruction about their rights. In their first year, they received more than 600,000 calls from women, some describing assault and rape within their marriage.

Judicial Stand

In Bhodhisathwa Gautam v Subhra Chakraborthy (1996 AIR 922) it was held that marital rape is violative of Article 21; Right to live with human dignity. Supreme Court held that Rape is a crime against basic human rights and is also violative of victim’s most cherished of the fundamental right. A married woman too has the right to live in human dignity, right to privacy and rights over her own body. Marriage can in no way take away these rights. 

In Justice K.S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 , it was held that the right to privacy as a fundamental right includes decisional privacy reflected by an ability to make intimate decisions primarily consisting of one’s sexual or procreative nature and decisions in respect of intimate relations.

Uncovering the history of judicial decisions on infliction of serious injury by the husband on the wife the court in Queen Empress v Haree Mythee, (1891) ILR 18 Cal 49 observed that in case of married women, the law of rape does not apply between a couple after the age of the wife over 15 years of age, even if the wife is over the age of 15, the husband has no right to disdain her physical safety.

In  Emperor v Shahu Mehrab (1911) ILR 38 Cal 96 the husband was convicted under Section 304A IPC for causing the death of his child-wife by rash or negligent act of sexual intercourse with her. 

In State of Maharashtra v Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207,  Supreme Court referred to the right to privacy over one’s body. It was decided that a prostitute had the right to refuse sexual intercourse. It is wistful to know that all sexual offences committed by a non-intimate or a stranger have been penalised and all females except wives have been granted their right over their bodies. 

In Sree Kumar v Pearly Karun, 1999 (2) ALT Cri 77 High Court observed that because the wife is living under the same roof with that of her husband, with no decree of separation, even if she is subjected to consensual or non-consensual sexual intercourse, the offence under Section 376A of IPC will not be imposed. 

The idea of spousal rape is fictious to the Indian Judiciary, despite the mental and physical trauma of the survivor. 

International Statistics 

Marital Rape has been declared illegal and a criminal offence in 18 American states, 3 Australian states, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. A U.K. case of R v R changed the law to an extent that the courts ruled that even within a marriage, any non-consensual sexual activity is rape.

What can be done?

To help the victim surf the trauma, shelters can be provided as a temporary safe place to stay and the staff may help in the consideration of options available, legal aid services to offer free of cost legal services and advice, support groups to help the victim voice the upheaval. Articulate support for the enforcement of apt laws and for new legislation to curb sexual violence, education programmes and support initiatives at local, state and national level.

Conclusion:

The incessant exemption of marital rape from the ambit of criminal law succours the idea of wife being the property of the husband exclusively. Changing the laws on sexual offences needs to be tactful especially in a country like India where there is an existence of diverse and conglomerate personal and religious laws that might clash with the new amendments in the statutory criminal law. The immediate need of prohibiting and criminalizing marital rape is just not enough. Sensitization of judiciary and police along with educating the myriad believers of the airy concept of marital rape is required in order to acknowledge that the concept of spousal rape; getting raped by one’s spouse is not trivial, and definitely cannot go unpunished. 

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By Samiksha Jain

Despite being the world’s largest constitutional democracy, India continues to struggle with heteronormative constraints that undermine different sexualities. For many years, the LGBTQ community has been at odds. The government’s main slogan has been to secure this community through justice, equity, and harmony. Previously, the LGBTQ community was known to simply include the gay community, but it eventually expanded to encompass different sorts of homosexuals. Discrimination against this minority has grown frequent; they have been separated and estranged from society, and they have been denied the basic fundamental rights to which they are entitled as Indian citizens. The rights of this group have recently been recognized, and the judiciary has intervened to preserve them.

As of today, members of the community do not have any special legal rights. They are allowed by law to participate in consensual sexual activity because criminalizing it would be a violation of their fundamental rights. As a result, the scope of their rights has to be understood to be the same  Fundamental Rights that citizens in this country have. However, members of the community, still do not have access to all the civil rights that citizens of India enjoy. For example, they are unable to legally register their marriages, as their union is not recognized by Indian law.

The landmark judgment of Navtej Singh v. Union of India (AIR 2018 SC 4321) was a breakthrough for the members of this community. On September 6, 2018, a five-judge panel unanimously declared Section 377 of Indian Penal Code as unconstitutional. The existence of a law that criminalized consensual sexual intercourse between adults was held to be violative of Article 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution and also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Court went on to say that all community members are entitled to all of the Constitution’s guarantees, including equal citizenship and protection from discrimination.

Indian Constitution and LGBTQ+ Community

Justice — social, economic, and political equality of status – is enshrined in the Indian Constitution’s preamble. In essence, the Indian Constitution is sex-blind, which means that the underlying assumption of equality is based on a constitutional mandate that the gender of an individual is irrelevant unless where the Constitution demands special provisions for everyone.

  • Right to Equality

Within the territory of India, Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees everyone equal standing before the law and equal protection under the law. The term “any person” here refers to any human, with no discrimination based on caste, creed, religion, sex, or any other category. The interpretation of the word “person” was broadened in the case of National Legal Service Authority v. Union of India (AIR 2014 SC 1863), and it was held that Article 14 of the Indian Constitution does not limit the word “person” and its application solely to males and females. Hijras/transgender people who are neither male nor female fit within the definition of “person” and are thus entitled to legal protection in all spheres of State activity, including healthcare, education, employment as well as equal civil and citizenship rights, as enjoyed by any other citizen of this country. 

  • Equality of Opportunity and Right against all forms of Discrimination

Articles 15 and 16 prohibit discrimination against any citizen on a list of grounds, which includes the bottom of the word “sex.” In fact, both Articles prohibit all forms of gender bias and discrimination based on gender. Sex has two separate components: gender and biological characteristics. Gender qualities include one’s character, the underlying psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character, as well as biological aspects such as genitals, chromosomes, and secondary sexual features. As a result, the discrimination on the bottom of ‘sex’ under Articles 15 and 16, includes discrimination on the bottom of identity.

  • Right to Life and Personal Liberty

The right to life is one of the most basic fundamental rights, and no one, including the government, has the capacity to violate or revoke it. The right to select one’s own identity is one of the most important rights under this article to living with dignity, according to the case of I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 2007 SC 861). One of the most essential features of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is the right to a dignified existence for transgender people. Non-recognition violates their right to dignity; hence they need full rights to specify and live their lives without fear.

  • Right against Exploitation

Various inhuman activities, such as human trafficking and beggary, have been designated as offences and are punishable under Article 23 of the Indian Constitution. The scope of Article 23 is extraordinarily broad because it encompasses any sort of prejudice that is prohibited. Transgender people are the worst victims of exploitation; because of their low socioeconomic standing, they engage in prostitution and other immoral acts, which society considers unacceptable. The goal of this article is to protect the independence of a person’s identity by prohibiting men from exploiting men.

Additionally, the Indian legal framework’s failure to recognize the “Third Gender” has resulted in systematic denial of equal protection under the law and pervasive socio-economic discrimination in society and in Indian workplaces. The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 was recently enacted by the Indian parliament in response to the NALSA judgment.

As defined in the Act, ‘transgender’ refers to and includes all individuals whose gender does not conform or match the gender assigned to them at birth, including trans-man and trans-woman (whether or not they have undergone sex reassignment surgery (‘SRS’) and individuals with socio-cultural identities such as ‘kinner’, ‘hijra’, ‘aravani’ and ‘jogta’. Below is the list of rights that this act guarantees. 

  • Prohibition against discrimination of transgender individuals: It prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals in the following areas: (i) education; (ii) employment; (iii) healthcare; (iv) access to, or enjoyment of, goods, facilities, or opportunities available to the general public; (v) right to movement; (vi) right to reside, rent, or otherwise occupy property; and (vii) opportunity to hold public or private official positions.
  • Certificate of identity for a transgender person: A transgender person can apply to the District Magistrate for a certificate of identity with the gender “transgender” written on it. Only if the person has surgery to change their gender, whether male or female, may they get an updated certificate.
  • Right of residence: Every transgender person has the right to live in his or her own home and be included in his or her family. If the transgender person’s immediate family is unable to care for them, a competent court may order that they be placed in a rehabilitation center.
  • Education: Without discrimination, educational institutions supported or recognized by the appropriate government must provide inclusive education, sports, and recreational facilities for transgender people.
  • Employment: In issues of employment, including recruiting and advancement, no government or commercial institution can discriminate against a transgender person. 
  • Health care: The government must take efforts to ensure that transgender people have access to health care, including specialized HIV surveillance centers and sex reassignment surgery. The government will revise medical curriculum to meet transgender people’s health concerns and provide comprehensive medical insurance plans for them.
  • Welfare measures by the government: It declares that the appropriate government will take steps to ensure transgender people’s full inclusion and engagement in society. It must also take steps to save and rehabilitate them, provide vocational training and self-employment, develop transgender-sensitive policies, and encourage their involvement in cultural events.
  • Offences and penalties: It recognize the following transgender-related offenses: (i) forced or bonded labor (excluding compulsory government service for public purposes), (ii) denial of access to public places, (iii) removal from the household and village, and (iv) physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, or economic abuse. The penalties for these offenses range from six months to two years in prison, as well as a fine.

Now, the significant question needs to be asked is: Is this law sufficient and fulfilling their purpose? The answer lies in the vehement unacceptance of this law by the members of LGBTQ+ community. When community members are dissatisfied with the laws that control them, good lawmaking and execution becomes difficult. This Act exemplifies the importance of consulting the citizens of the community for whom these laws are being enacted. A transgender person must file an application to the District Magistrate for a certificate of identity as a transgender person, according to this Act. This rule not only hinders self-determination, but it also ignores people who identify as non-binary or gender-neutral.

The country’s transgender population was dissatisfied with these parts of it at the time, claiming that they were discriminatory. They have waged a vigorous campaign against the Act. Again, ensuring that legislation are gender-neutral is one method to fix this. In the event when a specific segment of society, such as women, requires greater protection, new laws have been enacted to safeguard their interests. The LGBT community, too, needs to be uplifted. As a result, it is critical that new laws be enacted to protect their rights, and that they be consistent with current laws to avoid unintentional discrimination amongst communities or groups.

  • Samiksha Jain, a third-year student at Institute of Law Nirma University, Ahmedabad.
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Even after 70 years of its existence, the top court has not had a woman Chief Justice of India.

Lokendra Malik
First Published on Bar and Bench:
28 Mar, 2021 , 5:38 am

Though justice is usually portrayed as a woman, it has in general been embodied by men. The Supreme Court of India is also mainly a male-dominated institution. It has a strength of 34 judges, including the Chief Justice of India, but it has only one woman judge after the recent retirement of Justice Indu Malhotra.

There have been very few women judges in the Supreme Court up till now. Justice Fathima Beevi was the first woman judge of the Supreme Court of India, appointed in 1989. The second woman judge was Justice Sujata V Manohar, who was elevated to the Supreme Court in 1994. The third woman judge, Justice Ruma Pal, came to the Supreme Court in the year 2000. After her retirement, it was Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra who came to the Supreme Court in 2010. In 2011, Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai was appointed to the Supreme Court. Justice R Banumathi was elevated to the Supreme Court in 2014. Justices Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, who will retire next year, came to the Supreme Court in 2018. All these women judges have made great contributions to the Indian judicial system by delivering judgments on a variety of significant issues relating to public, private law, and governance.

Even after 70 years of its existence, the top court has not had a woman Chief Justice of India. The reason is very simple. First, a lack of willpower on the part of judge-makers, and second, the formality of seniority convention plays a very significant role in making the Chief Justice of India. No lady judge reaches that zone of consideration because of the lack of seniority. For reaching the top position in the apex court, a judge needs a fairly long tenure of eight or nine years.

Only two times was this seniority convention breached – in 1973 and 1977 during the tenure of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi – when junior judges were appointed to the office of the Chief Justice of India by superseding their seniors. The legal fraternity had rightly criticized such judicial supersessions. But thereafter, the seniority convention has been followed consistently in the appointment of the Chief Justice of India and there does not seem to be any apprehension of its dilution in the future as the Supreme Court has also approved this seniority convention in the Second Judges’ case in 1993.

The Supreme Court Collegium may consider elevating a woman judge who can have a tenure long enough to become the Chief Justice of India as per the seniority convention. This is a much-needed step toward the cause of women’s empowerment in the judiciary. Bypassing the seniority convention is neither possible nor desirable as judicial supersessions cause irreparable damage to judicial independence and give unwanted opportunity to the executive to control the judiciary. The timely appointment of woman judges so that they have long tenures is the best solution. And for this purpose, the Supreme Court collegium should take the initiative.

Post-1993, the judiciary has taken the power to appoint judges from the executive through constitutional interpretation, in the larger interests of judicial independence. Before 1993, the Prime Minister and the Union Law Minister were very powerful in making judicial appointments. They were the real judge-makers in the country. But now they have lost such influence. Under the existing practice, the judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President of India on the recommendation of the Supreme Court Collegium, which is headed by the Chief Justice of India and consists of four of his senior-most colleagues. This Collegium is the actual judge-maker and the President, Prime Minister, and the Union Law Minister have little say in judicial appointments.

However, the Central government has some scope to delay judicial appointments in some cases. The decisions of the Collegium are made by consensus. If two or more judges oppose the Chief Justice’s proposals, the Collegium cannot finalize the names and the President is also not bound to accept such recommendations. This exercise is done to eliminate the sole authority of the Chief Justice of India in judicial appointments. Now the CJI has to build a consensus among all his colleagues and finalize the names accordingly. He cannot ignore their views at all.

The President of India is bound to act as per the recommendation of the Collegium if it decides the names by consensus. However, the President, as aided and advised by the Prime Minister, has an option to return the recommendation of the Collegium once for its reconsideration. Thereafter, the President is bound to accept the Collegium’s recommendation if it reiterates its view. In other words, the Collegium has the final say in judicial appointments.

The present Supreme Court Collegium is headed by Chief Justice SA Bobde. Its other members are Justices NV Ramana, RF Nariman, UU Lalit, and AM Khanwilkar. As of now, the Supreme Court has four vacancies and five more judges will retire by the end of this year. Despite this, the Collegium headed by Chief Justice Bobde has not made even a single appointment to the Supreme Court. As per media reports, there is some deadlock in the Collegium, which has not reached a consensus on Chief Justices of High Courts who are eligible for elevation to the top court as per the seniority rule.

Chief Justice Bobde will retire next month. The last time a Chief Justice of India retired without recommending a single appointment to the Supreme Court was in 2015 (during the tenure of Chief Justice HL Dattu), when there was an unprecedented deadlock between the Central government and the judiciary on the issue of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). After Chief Justice Bobde’s retirement, Justice N V Ramana is likely to become the Chief Justice of India as per the order of seniority.

There is no dearth of brilliant women High Court judges and lawyers in the country. There are many brilliant women lawyers and judges who, if elevated soon to the top court, can become the Chief Justice of India after a few years as per the seniority rule. The biggest issue is to include them in the seniority circle so that they could come to the top after a few years. I think this is a great opportunity for the Collegium to give India its first woman Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It is not a difficult task. It requires strong commitment to the cause of women’s empowerment in the judiciary.

In addition to this, the Supreme Court needs more women judges also. There should be at least four to five women judges in the Supreme Court. The Court decides many important issues which can be properly adjudicated with the help of a woman judge’s perspective. Some brilliant women lawyers can also be considered for the judgeship in the top court.

Justice Indu Malhotra is the first woman to be directly elevated from the Bar. This trend of making appointments from the Bar needs to be continued in the future also. Some brilliant legal academics can also be considered for judgeship in the Supreme Court, given the constitutional provision of appointments of ‘distinguished jurists’ to the top court.

When it comes to the question of appointment of judges to the Supreme Court from the High Courts, seniority and regional representation are the major criteria that the Collegium considers. But there have been instances where judges have been directly elevated to the Supreme Court by relaxing the seniority norm. It is not rocket science. If senior women judges are not available, there are no written rules that stop the Collegium from appointing a High Court judge or a practicing lawyer to the Supreme Court. Ultimately, the final choice of judges depends on consensus within the Collegium. If all the collegium members decide that it is time to recommend a woman judge’s name for the Supreme Court judgeship, they can do so and a woman judge can be appointed to the Supreme Court at this time.

So, all this depends on the will power of the Collegium, which has conclusive power in judicial appointments. There is no reason to assume that the Central government will not appreciate this idea, which promotes women’s empowerment. So, now the ball is in the Collegium’s court.

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